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In Tl1e Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LAUREN "\V. GIBBS, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respon-dent,
YS.

E. E. ~IONSON, Secretary of State of
the State of Utah, JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of the State of
Utah, and RULON F. STARLEY,
State Bank Cmnmissioner of the
State of Utah, as members of the
Securities Commission of the State
of Utah, and the SECURITIES
CO~I:MISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,

No. 6331

Defendants and Appellants.
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In The Suprellle Court
of the State of Utah
L~\UREX

"\Y. GIBBS, INC., a cor-

poration,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
YS.

E. E. :JIOXSOX, Secretary of State of
the State of rtah, JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of the State of
Utah, and RULON F. STABLEY,
State Bank Commissioner of the
State of Utah, as members of the
Securities Commission of the State
of rtah, and the SECURITIES
CO~LJIISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,

No. 6331

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH,
HONORABLE ALLEN G. THURMAN, JUDGE,
PRESIDING
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 18, 1939, the Securities Commission
revoked the registration of respondent as a dealer in
securities, claiming to act under Sec. 82-1-21, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933.
On December 18, 1939, the respondent instituted an
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, pursuant to Sec. 82-1-41, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933. The complaint alleged, in addition to the
formal allegations of jurisdiction:
That the Utah Securities Commission issued an
order to show cause which is set forth in the complaint
(Abs. 2) and which stated that an information in writing
had been filed with the Securities Commission but that
plaintiff was not furnished the "information in writing"
or any portion there,of or any information concerning the
nature thereof.
1.

2. That a suspension order set forth in the complaint (Abs. 3) failed to state facts sustaining the suspension order and that the suspension order was issued
contrary to law.
3. That a bill of particulars was furnished to the
plaintiff wherein and whereby the defendants became the
complainants, the prosecutors, and the court, all combined in one tribunal, in violation of the due process clause
of the State and Federal constitutions.
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4. That the so-railed bill of particulars and the socalled amended bill of particulars failed to set forth facts
sufficient to support the order to show cause and failed
to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
and failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
for the suspension of the plaintiff and to constitute fraud
or any violation of law. (Abs. 5, 7.)
5. That at no time ,,~as the plaintiff informed as to
the defendants' informant nor was he confronted with
said informant or complaining witness. (.Abs. 5.)
6. That the defendants were without jurisdiction
to enter their final order of cancellation of November
18, 1939, because all of the transactions therein mentioned
pertained to securities expressly exempted by law, to-wit,
municipal bonds, and contrary to and in violation of Sec.
29, Art. 6 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and
constitute an isolated transaction expressly exempted
from the defendant's jurisdiction by law. (Abs. 7.)
7. That the Securities Commission failed to give
the plaintiff a copy of the transcript of the evidence adduced at the proceedings upon the demand made. (Abs. 7.)
8. That Title 82 of the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, and particularly Sec. 82-1-21, Subsection (4), violates Article 5 and Sec. 1 of Article 6 of the Constitution
of Utah, and constitutes a delegation to an administrative
body and to the executive branch of the state government
of powers and functions properly belonging and appertaining to the legislative department thereof. (Abs. 7.)
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9. That the Commission at the time of its determination had before it a complete transcript of the evidence
adduced by the Commission and did not have before it in
transcript form the evidence adduced by the plaintiff.
(Abs. 8.)
10. That the findings of fact and conclusions made
by the Securities Commission are in conflict with the
evidence; that the conclusions are contrary to law and
are not supported by the findings of fact and the evidence; and that the order of cancellation is contrary t0
law. (Abs. 8, 9.)
11. That the plaintiff has committed no act which
justifies the final order of cancellation, that the attorney
general conceded that there \Yas no charge or evidence of
actual fraud or intent to defraud.
Plaintiff then prayed judgment ''setting aside and
revoking the order of cancellation of registration entered
by the defendants against the plaintiff on the 18th day
of November, 1939, and that the defendants be required
to return to this court a transcript of the proceedings
had before it in the matter of the order to show cause
issued to the plaintiff herein, as hereinbefore set forth,
together with a transcript of the evidence adduced at the
hearing upon said order to show cause, within the time
allowed by law for the defendants to answer the complaint of the plaintiff herein, and for such other and
further relief as may be proper in the premises.'' (Abs.
11.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
Securities Commission were attached to the complaint as
Exhibit "A". (Abs. 12-22.)
The District Court then made an ex parte order that
the defendants return to that Court a full and complete
transcript of the proceedings had before the Commission,
and that pending the determination of this cause and
until the judgment of this Court becomes final the order
of the defendants cancelling plaintiff's registration as a
dealer in securities, dated November 18, 1939, shall be
suspended and the right of plaintiff .to do business in.
the State of Utah as a licensed dealer in securities shall
continue. ( Abs. 23.)
The defendants demurred generally that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action and that the Court has no jurisdiction of the
subject _of the action:
(a) For the reason that no notice of appeal had
been given and no bond or security for costs ordered or
posted.
(b) For the reason that Title 82, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, authorizes no review of the proceedings
of the Securities Commission.
Defendants also demurred specially, setting forth
the sole ground that the complaint is ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain "in that it cannot be told thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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from whether a new and independent action is sought
to be instituted or whether a writ of review of the proceedings of these defendants against the plaintiff herein
as described in said complaint is sought, or whether said
complaint is intended to be an appeal from the order of
these defendants in said proceedings.'' ( Abs. 24.)
The defendants also moved to vacate the court order
suspending the order of the Securities Commission. The
demurrer was overruled and motion denied (Abs. 26),
and defendants, standing on their demurrer and motion,
appealed. ( Abs. 27-31.)

ARGUMENT
Appellants by their assignments raise two main
questions: the content matter of the plaintiff's complaint
(general demurrer in assignment IV); and the procedure
requested by the plaintiff and followed by the district
court (assignments I, II, III and IV, special demurrer).
We shall discuss the content matter first and the procedural element second.

I. The Plaintiff's Complaint Stated a Cause of Action. (Assignment IV, general demurrer.)
It is elementary that a general demurrer must be
overruled if any part of the complaint states a cause of
action (De La Y sla v. Publix The.atres Corporation, 82
Utah, 528, 26 Pac. (2d) 818; Wright v. Intermountain
Motor Car Company, 53 Utah 176, 177 Pac. 237; Sweet v.
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Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 Pac.1167.) Even though
this Court should find that part of the allegations of the
complaint were superfluous, still if other parts state a
cause of action the lower court properly overruled the
general demurrer. \Ye submit that any one of the following grounds alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause
of action sufficient to support the overruling of a general
demurrer.

A. The complaint alleged that the Commission were
wholly zcithont jurisdiction to enter their fimal order of
cancellation because Title 82, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933: and particularly Sec. 82-1-21 Subsection ( 4) thereof,
·is contrary to lau.· and is unconstitutional. (Par. 12-c of
the complaint, Abs. 7.)

Sec. 82-1-21 is that section which empowers the Commission to cancel registration. It lists five grounds for
the cancellation as follows:
"Registration under sections 82-1-15 and 821-17 may be refused, or any registration granted
may be cancelled, by the commission, if after a
reasonable notice and a hearing the commission
determines that such applicant or registrant so
registered :
"(1) Has violated any provisions of this
chapter or any regulation made hereunder; or,
'' (2) Has made a material false statement
in the application for registration; or,
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" (3) Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in
connection with any sale of securities, or has been
or is engaged, or is about to engage, in making
fictitious or pretended sales or purchases of any
securities, or has been or is engaged, or is about
to engage, in any practice or sale of securities
which is fraudulent or in violation of law; or,
"'(4) Has demonstrated his unworthiness
to transact the business of dealer, salesman or
agent; or,

" ( 5)

Is insolvent."

Only two of these grounds are named in the Commission's order as a basis of the cancellation (.Abs. 3) :
(1) That the plaintiff has been guilty of a fraudulent
act; and, (2) That the plaintiff has demonstrated its
''unworthiness'' to transact the business of a dealer in
securities.
The conclusions of law on which the order is based
(Abs. 21), however, do not find any fraudulent act and
leave ''unworthiness'' as the sole basis of the order of
cancellation. This order, then, depends for its validity
upon Subsection ( 4) of Sec. 82-1-21 of Revised Statutes,
1933: Registration may be cancelled if the commission
determines that the registrant "has demonstrated his
unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer, salesman or agent.'' This section is unconstitutional.
Article V of the Constitution of Utah reads as
follows:
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'•The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departnlents shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.''
Sec. 1 of Article 6 of the Utah Constitution provides
that the legislative power of the State shall be vested in
the Legislature of the State of Utah. Subsection (4) of
Sec. 82-1-21, of the Revised Statutes, 1933, is a delegation
by the Legislature of legislative powers to an administrative body-a branch of the executive power-without
any limitation upon the discretion and power of the
Commission. This Court has held that such deleg~tion
cannot be done. In Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89
Utah 404, 57, Pac. (2d) 734, the validity of Sec. 93-1-5,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, was questioned. This
section provided that any person failing to affix certain
cigarette stamps shall be required to pay as part of the
tax a penalty of not less than $10.00, nor more than
$299.00 for each offense, to be affixed and collected
by the State Tax Commission. The State Tax Commission, after a hearing, placed a penalty of $250.00 on the
plaintiffs. :1\;Ir. Justice Wolfe, in expressing the majority
opinion holding the statute unconstitutional, said:
"In this case, the Legislature gave the tax
commission not only power to hear and determine whether a penalty should attach, but within
the limits of from $10 to $299 to fix the penalty.
The commission fixed it at $250. This involved
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not only the function of determining whether a
situation was such as would work an imposition
of the penalty fixed or ascertainable by law and
the function of imposing such penalty, but the
function and power of determining the amount of
the penalty. This involves not the question of
whether the Legislature gave the tax commission
a judicial rather than an administrative power
(unless we accept the plaintiffs' contention that
this power to determine the amount of the penalty
is really fixing punishment for a crime), but the
question of whether the Legislature could delegate such power to determine the amount, in its
discretion, to any tribunal as a matter of penalty
imposed not as punishment for a crime but as a
sanction to pay the tax. We think it could not do
so. Giving to the tax commission the power to
determine in its own judgment the amount of the
penalty was a legislative function which could not
be delegated. It is not the power to enforce or
apply a law, but the power to make a law for
each particular case, to determine in its judgment
the amount of a penalty. We recognize the power
to make reasonable rules and regulations and to
make a failure to obey them involve a loss of
rights either given by law or by the regulations
themselves. But in this case there was no basis
provided for the commission to ascertain the
amount of the penalty by a mathematical computation, but the broad power to determine its
amount within its discretion, from $10 up to
$299 . . . The infirmity in 93-1-5 lies in the fact
that the tax commission can in each case name a
different sum. It has not set a standard for all
cases which fit the rule, but in each case within its
mind at its discretion fixes the amount. Only
the courts in imposing a fine as a punishment for
a crime have this discretion.''
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What standards does the Utah Statute set as a guide
for our Securities Commission, so far as its action against
the plaintiff is concerned~ None whatever. It states
that the registration may be canceled if the Commission
determines that the registrant so registered "has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business of
dealer, salesman, or agent." Unworthiness is not such
a term as common law has defined or limited. It is new
in the law. Its interpretation depends upon the wish and
whim of the Commission. A man is unworthy if he does
not meet standards which the Commission will have set
up itself. The Commission may one day be in a mood
to declare certain actions unworthy and on another day
the same actions worthy. No guiding limitation is present in the statute to prevent such a situation. The Commission here is given a free hand, and can determine at
will whether a registrant has demonstrated his "unworthiness." It must determine by its own standards
what ''unworthiness'' means.
In a long line of decisions, the U. S. Supreme Court
has held the Constitution of the United States to require
a separation of powers, under which the power to make
regulations for administering the laws can be delegated
by Congress. In all of these cases it was recognized
that there were limits in this delegation; and, finally, in
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 79 L. Ed.
446, it was determined that the limits had been crossed.
The reason for finding there that the Congress had
delegated too much are set forth in the terse statements
of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''As to the transportation of oil production
in excess of State permission, the Congress has
declared no policy, has established no standard,
has laid down no rule. There is no requirement,
no definition of circumstances and conditions in
which the transportation is to be allowed or
prohibited."
In Schechter v. U. 8., 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570,
the U. S. Supreme Court held that the N.R.A. Statute was
an invalid delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for
the court, said :
''The Congress is not permitted to abdicate
or to transfer to others the essential legislative
functions with which it is thus vested. We have
repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting
legislation to complex conditions involving a host
of details with which the National Legislature
cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Ref. Co. Case that the Constitution has never
been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which
will enable it to perform its function in laying
down policies and establishing standards, while
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making
of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and
the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply. But we
said that the constant recognition of the necessity
and validity of such provisions, and the wide
range of administrative authority which has been
developed by means of them, cannot be allowed
to obscure the limitations of the authority to
delegate, if our constitutional system is to be
maintained. Id. p. 421.
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"Accordingly, we look to the statute to see
whether Congress has overstepped these limitations,-whether Congress in authorizing' Codes of
Fair Competition' has itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential leg-islative function, or, by the failure to
enact such standards, has attempted to transfer
that function to others ...
''To summarize and conclude upon this point :
Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade,
industry or activity. It does not undertake to
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate
administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing
rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes
to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Section 3 sets up no standards, aside from
the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in. Section 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that
are imposed, the discretion of the President in
approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting
laws for the government of trade and industry
throughout the country, is virtually unfettered.
We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
The Illinois Court, 1n Chicagoland Agencies v.
Palmer, 364 Ill. 13, 2 N. E. (2d) 910, held unconstitutional
a section of an act very similar to the one involved in the
case at bar and which reads as follows :
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''A certificate issued under this Act may be
revoked and/ or a renewal thereof refused by the
Director, if after due investigation and a hearing
either before him or before any salaried employee
of the insurance department de signa ted by him
whose report he may adopt, he determines thai
the holder of such certificate
"(a) has violated any provision of the insurance law; or
"(b) has intentionally made a material misstatement in the application for such certificate; or
" (c) has been guilty of fraudulent or dishonest practices ; or
" (d) has demonstrated his incompetency or
untrustworthiness to transact the insurance brokerage business.''
This section was declared unconstitutional because
no standard of qualification was required of the person
before whom the hearing was to be held and because no
definition of the term ''due investigation'' was given, thP
Court saying:
''What does the term 'due investigation,'
used in section 11, contemplate~ The director is
left without restraint to interpret that phrase. It
is possible that each succeeding director may
place a substantially different meaning upon it.
Even a salaried employee designated from time
to time by the director might differ in his interpretation of the term from that of some previous
salaried employee so acting, as to the character
and type of investigation to be heard on the in-
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quiry before him. It is significant that no charges
are required to be filed under any of the four
subdivisions of section 11. No provision is made
for the giving of notice of such charge to the
agent or broker under investigation so that he
may know what accusation he is to meet, and prepare his defense, if any; no place is fixed for the
hearing nor the manner or the giving of notice
thereof; no procedure is prescribed for the production or consideration of the evidence, subpoenaing of witnesses, administering of an oath
thereto, nor the preservation of the record. These
usual and necessary incidents to a "'hearing,' as
that term is commonly understood, are lacking,
but the director alone, determines what manner
of hearing will be had and the procedure to be
followed.
"An act to be valid, may not be vague, indefinite, and uncertain, but must be complete when
it leaves the Legislature and be sufficiently explicit to advise everyone what his rights are under
it and how he will be affected by its operation ...
''The powers attempted to be conferred upon
the director are so arbitrary, unlimited, and unrestrained that such powers are in direct conflict
with the constitutional command that the Legislature may not delegate its legislative function to
any person or body."
In Malloy v. City of Chicago, 365 Ill. 604, 7 N. E.
(2) 320, the statute provided that in cities of a certain
population, policemen or firemen who have attained the
age of 63 years ''shall be retired from active service
upon the order of the head of the police or fire departSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment of such city, as the case may be." The Court said,
in holding this unconstitutional:
"The objection to this act is that it is incomplete and leaves the retirement of policemen
and firemen to the whims of the head of these
departments without rules to guide their action.
It has frequently been held by this court that,
while the method and manner of enforcing an act
of the General Assembly must, of necessity, be
left to the reasonable discretion of administrative
. officers, yet a statute which vests in such officers
a discretion, not only as to the administration of
the act but also to determine what the law is, or to
apply it to one and refuse its application to another in like circumstances, is void, as an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority.''
In Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457, the
Wisconsin Court held invalid a Blue Sky law on the same
ground, that the Legislature had failed to give standards
to the administrative body. That act gave the power to
the Commission to declare voidable any sale not made in
conformity with the requirements of the Commission.
The Court ~aid:
"The difficulty with the statute is that it
leaves it in the discretion of the Conlmission to
say what shall happen. This clearly brings it
within the condemnation of the decision in Borgnis v. Falk Co., supra, as a delegation of legislative
power; the fact that it attempts to delegate to the
Commission the power to make an award which
shall be just and equitable without erecting any
standard, but leaving it wholly within the discre-
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tion of the Commission, makes it a clear delegation of judicial power using these terms in their
commonest and best understood 1neaning. No
refinements need to be indulged in in this case to
show that the powers granted to the Commission
are those which are vested by the Constitution
respectively in the Legislature and the courts.
Our attention is called to no case where a similar
delegation of power has been sustained, where the
act itself did not prescribe some standard by which
the discretion of the Commission or other administrative body was to be controlled and measured.''
People v. Federal Surety Company, 336 Ill. 472, 168
N. E. 401, declared unconstitutional the Illinois Securitie~
Act, requiring that no person should sell securities, unless
registered with the Secretary of State, as owner, dealer,
and broker. In condemning the statute giving the Secretary of State authority to fix the bond, the decision said:

'' 'The true distinction is between a delegation
of power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no objection
can be made.' Examples of this distinction are
found in the cases of People v. Cregier, 138 Ill.
401, 28 N. E. 812, and Harrison v. People, 222 Ill.
150, 78 N. E. 52. It is apparent that section 23
was not complete when it came from the Legislature. No one can tell the amount of the bond
required for the license as a dealer and broker
in securities, or the conditions which it should
contain, until the Secretary of State had fixed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
amount and the terms and conditions in each
particular case, and the section fixed no rules
which he should follow in determining these questions. The appellant"s objection to the constitutionality of these requirements of the section
should have been sustained.''
After that decision, the Illinois Legislature attempted
to make its standards more precise in delegating power
to the Secretary of State, and still failed, the Court saying, People v. J. 0. Beckman & Co., 347 Ill. 92, 179 N. E.
435:
''The enactment of 1929 attempted to establish rules to serve as a guide to the secretary of
state in fixing the amount of the bond. It sets
out three factors which the secretary of state i~
to investigate and consider: First, the proposed
method of transacting the business ; second, the
financial standing of the applicant; and, third, the
experience, ability and general reputation for integrity of the applicant, or if a corporation, of
its officers, managers, and principal agents. This
section does not fix a standard of qualifications or
fitness for applicants. There is nothing to indicate how much experience or ability or what
amount of capital shall be necessary to justify
the secretary of state in fixing the bond at the
minimum amount and when the maximum amount
shall be required. While the manner of executing
a law must necessarily be left to the reasonable
discretion of an administrative officer and the
exercise of that discretion does not constitute the
exercise of judicial power (ltalia America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427, 154 N. E. 198),

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
yet in the absence of rules by which the administra tiYe officer may be guided in the exercise of
that discretion the law is incomplete. People v.
Federal s~uety Co., supra; City of Chicago v.
ll!atthies, 320 Ill. 352, 151 N. E. 248; People v.
Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377. All of the
guides given to the secretary of state for determining the amount of the bond leavetohimhis own
interpretation and definition of the terms used in
the statute. A law vesting discretionary power
in an administrative officer without properly defining the terms under which his discretion is to
be exercised is void as being an unlawful delegation of legislative power.''
The ~Iinnesota Court, in State v. Great Northern
Railzcay, 111 N. "\Y. 289, held invalid the statute requiring
a permit from the Commission for a railroad corporation
to increase its capital stock, the Court saying:
''The statute declares that before any such
corporation shall increase its capital stock it shall
apply to the commission in writing, setting forth
the amount of the proposed increase and the
purpose for which it is desired. The commission
must then fix a time and place for hearing the
matter and give notice thereof. Upon the hearing
the commission must make a finding of the facts
established in reference to the proposed increase.
What must they then do1 Must they allow the
increase if they find that 'the amount of the proposed increase and the purpose for which it is
desired' are such as are authorized by law~
Certainly not. There is no such provision in the
statute. The language of the statute cannot by
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any fair or permissible construction be so read.
On the contrary, the language used is: If they
allow it (the application for an increase of stock),
they shall prescribe the manner in which and the
terms upon which the same shall be made. If
they disapprove of such increase, the reasons
therefor shall,be stated in their next annual report. Nor shall the capital stock of any such
corporation be increased, except by special authority of such commission. The prescribing 'the
manner in which and the terms upon which' the
capital stock of railway corporations may be increased is a legislative power, not an administrative duty, and cannot be delegated. And yet this
is just what the Legislature attempted to do by
this statute, unless the words we have quoted can
be read out of it, and the omitted provisions we
have indicated be read into it, by construction.
It is only by arbitrarily so construing the statute
that we can hold that it authorizes the commission
to supervise the issuance of only such stock
as is authorized by law, and to charge them with
the duty of ascertaining in each case whether the
proposed increase is for an authorized purpose
and in accordance with the requirements of the
law.''
The Supreme Court of California, in Hewitt v. Board
of Medical Examiners of the State, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac.
39, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 113 Am. St. Rep. 315, 7 Ann.
Cases, 750, held the term ''grossly improbable statements,., in the statute too indefinite to permit the Board
of Medical Examiners to cancel a physician's license. This
Court said:
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''Under this provision the penalty of forfeihue of a physician's license is not made to depend
upon falsity in fact of any matter contained in
a statement, or knowledge on the part of the physician that it is false, or for the reason that it was
intended or had a tendency to deceive the public,
or to impose upon credulous or ignorant persons
and so be harmful and injurious to public morals,
health, and safety. It is a matter of no moment
under the provision of the act, and is entirely immaterial whether the statement is true or false,
beneficial or injurious. If, in the opinion of the
board, the statement is 'grossly improbable,' the
certificate to practice is to be revoked. The right
of the physician to be secure in his privilege of
practicing his profession is thus made to depend,
not upon any definition which the law furnishes
him as to what shall constitute 'grossly improbable statements,' but upon the determination of
the board after the statement is made and simply
upon its opinion of its improbability. No definite
standard is furnished by the law under this provision whereby a physician with any safety can
advertise his medical business; nor is there any
definite rule declared whereby after such advertisement is had the board of medical examiners
shall be controlled in determining its probability
or improbability.''
In Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241, 89 N.
E. 245, the ·Massachusetts Court held that an ordinance
providing that no person should occupy, use or maintain
any building for the purpose of packing, sorting or storing rags without a permit in writing from the chief of
the fire department was invalid because there was nothSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing in the ordinance to guide him in passing upon the
applications that might be made to him.
In State of Washington v. Superior Court, 113 Wash.
296, 193 Pac. 845, the Washington Court held invalid an
ordinance which provided that the license could be '' revoked by the commissioner of public safety in his discretion for disorderly or immoral conduct or gambling on
the premises, or whenever the preservation of public
morality, health, peace, or good order shall in his judgment render such revocation necessary.''
The Utah Supreme Court, in Eureka City v. Wilson,
15 Utah 67, 48 Pac. 150, held that the following ordinance
was an unlawful delegation of legislative power:
"provided, that any person desiring to erect a
building of other material than those above specified within said fire limits, shall first apply to the
committee on buildings within said fire limits of
the city for permission so to do, and if the consent
of the committee on building within said fire
limits shall be given, they shall issue a permit,
and it shall thereupon he lawful to erect such
building under such regulations and restrictions
as the committee on building within said fire
limits may provide.' ''
The Utah Securities Commission by the subsection
( 4) challenged in the complaint is given as much liberty
to set the standards of ''unworthiness' as the commissions in the cases just quoted, which could set the standards, dismiss policemen and firemen at will, set the
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amount of a bond at will, determine the amount of a fine
at will, and interpret the meaning of the term ''due investigation" at will. "Unworthiness'' is not a term
which has been defined by a long series of judicial decisions as has "negligence H. Whether a man is worthy
or not to sell securities depends upon the individual experience or interpretation of the commission at the time
of its order and even upon its whim and caprice. The
Constitution does not permit our Legislature to delegate
its legislative functions in this manner.
The quotations made by appellants' brief under this
topic do not stand for what they seem to say when taken
out of their context. For example, the note to Meffert v.
Packer, 1 L.R.A. (N. S.) 811, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247 is
quoted, but the case itself does not use the term "unworthy" either in the statute or in its discussion. Even
though the case itself were approved by this Court, it is
not authority for the point urged by appellants. "Gross
immorality" has a clearly limited social meaning well
defined by custom which the term ''unworthy'' totally
lacks.
Re Hastings (Hartung's) Estate (Nevada, 160 Pac.

782, cited on page 32 of appellants' brief involves the interpretation of a will which uses the word ''unworthy.''
Manifestly, the interpretation of a will should not be used
as an analogy to the requirement of definiteness of a term
in a statute.
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Alsup v. State, 238 S. W. 667, likewise bears no relationship to the problem of delegation of legislative power.
It involved the guilt of a defendant in a criminal court
under a statute defining as criminal libel a statement
"that any person in office or a candidate therefor, is dishonest and therefore unworthy of such office . . . "
Clearly, under this statute the term "unworthy" was
limited by the definable term "dishonest". The Court's
attempted definition of the term "unworthy" illustrates
the flexibility of the word. "Unworthy," said the Court,
"means 'unbecoming,' 'discreditable,' 'not having suitable qualities or value,' 'beneath the character of.' "
Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S. W. 586, a Texas case, is
the only citation which even approaches the question in
hand. That is the sole case which the author of the
paragraph in 66 C. J. 63 (quoted on page 32 of appellants'
brief) cites as authority for the paragraph. The case
involved the cancellation of the certificate of a teacher by
the superintendent of public instruction. The Court held
that the term "unworthy" is so flexible that it is difficult for legislative enumeration and is therefore proper
for an administrative body to interpret. Whatever pertinency the case has to the question at hand, certainly
this holding is so contrary to fundamental conceptions
that definite standards must be given to administrative
bodies, and is so contrary to the attitude heretofore taken
by this Court that it should not be used as authority.
That Texas Court in its own definition shows how impossible it is to define "unworthy'' in any terms whieh
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would serve as standards for an administrative body.
It said:
"The word 'unworthy' as used in common
parlance, has a well-defined signification. As
here used, it means the lack of 'worth'; the absence of those moral and mental qualities which
are required to enable one to render the service
essential to the accomplishment of the object
which the law has in view. It may also include
those positive traits of character which, notwithstanding excellent educational attainments, unfit
one to impart proper instruction to the young. To
call one 'unworthy' is to impute moral delinquency
to a degree of unfitness for the work in hand.
There are many characteristics which may and
should be considered in passing upon the issue of
unworthiness in a teacher in the public schools.
Different minds might reach different conclusions
as to what qualities of character should render one
unworthy to hold a certificate to teach. But there
can be no difference of opinion about the fact that
an unworthy person should not be permitted to
teach in the public schools. What qualities, or
lack of qualities, should render one unworthy
,would be difficult for legislative enumeration.
They are so numerous, and their combinations so
varied in different individuals, that a statute
which undertakes to be more specific would either
be incomplete, or so flexible as to defeat the ends
sought." (Italics added.)
Such an argument has only one logical conclusion:
That the Legislature must use such other terms
than "unworthiness' to set a limitation upon the broad
powers and discretion of the commission.
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Clearly, Sec. 82-1-21, Subsection (4), of the Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, is an unlawful delegation of
legislative power, and paragraph 12-c of the complaint
which sets that out states a cause of action.

B. The complaint alleged that the commission were
wholly without jurisdiction to enter their final order of
cancellation because the trOJnsaction on which the order
is base.d is exempted by statute from the jurisdiction of
the commission. (Paragraphs 12a, 23 of the complaint,
Abs. 6, 11.)
Sec. 82-1-5, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides:
''Except as hereinafter otherwise expressly
provided, the provisions of this chapter shall not
apply to any of the following classes of securities:
( 1) Any security issued or guaranteed by the
United States or any territory or insular possession thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or
by any State or political subdivision or agency
thereof ... '' (Italics added.)
Sec. 82-1-6 of the same statutes provides:
''Except as hereinafter expressly provided,
the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to
the sale of any security in any of the following
cases ...
'' ( 3) An isolated transaction in which any
security is sold, offered for sale, subscription or
delivery by the owner thereof or by his representative for the owner's account, such sale or offer
for sale, subscription or delivery not being made
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in the course of repeated and successive transactions of a like character by such owner or on his
account by such representative, and such owner
or representatiYe not being the underwriter of
such security . . . ' '
Then follow exceptions to these exemptions which
do not apply.
Sec. 82-1-15 of the same statute provides:
''X o dealer or salesman shall engage in business in this state as such dealer or salesman, or
sell any securities including securities exempted
in Sec. 82-1-5 except in transactions exempt under
Sec. 82-1-6 unless he has been registered as a
dealer or salesman in the office of the commission
pursuant to the provisions of this section.'' (Italics added.)
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law as set
forth in the complaint show better than any argument
that ''all of the transactions'' mentioned in paragraph
12a of the complaint and questioned in appellants' brief
are all part and parcel of one single isolated transaction,
to-wit, the refunding of the debt of the City of Mt. Pleasant. This is an isolated transaction, and the respondent,
as agent of the City, was exempted by Sec. 82-1-15 from
the provisions of the chapter under which his registration
was revoked. Paragraph 12a of the complaint states a
cause of action.
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C. The complaint alleged that the procedure before
the Securities Commission was not a fair trial and deprived the plaintiff of due process of law. (Paragraphs
4 to 11, 13 to 18; Abs. 2-6, 8-9.)

It is fundamental that both in an administrative
hearing and in a court a man who is being deprived of
rights must have a fair hearing and be apprised in advance of the charges against him. The fact that the hearing is before an administrative body does not excuse
irregularities that have repeatedly been declared to deprive a defendant of his inalienable rights. Whether the
restrictions to protect rights in the proceedings before
an administrative body in a hearing criminal or quasi
criminal in character such as this is, can be relaxed to
any greater degree than can those in a court trial, and
if so, to what degree, this Court has not yet decided,
but it has decided that an irregular hearing vitiates an
order. In McGreU' v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah
203, 85 Pac. 2d 608, the Industrial Commission conducted
a hearing in an informal fashion as a public meeting.
Opponents and proponents were alloted three hours each
to talk about the matters. No witnesses were sworn and
no record was made of their statements. The Supreme
Court in condemning this said:
''The legislature in requiring a full and public
hearing had regard to judicial standards-not in
a technical sense but in regards to fundamental
requirements of fairness,-that one shall hear before one condemns, and that judgments shall be
based on evidence-which are the essence of due
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process in a proceeding of a judicial nature. Maintaining of proper standards by administrative
agencies charged with quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions is of the highest importance and
in the interest of the agency itself. Thus only
can it maintain the confidence and respect essential to a proper performance of its duties. For
these agencies, which necessarily multiply in our
complex society,-to serve the purposes for which
they are created and endowed with such vast
power, they must accredit themselves by acting in
harmony with the inbred concepts of fair play and
the cherished traditions of a cautious, deliberate
and judicious determination of the questions affecting people's rights or liberties."
For the Gibbs hearing before the Securities Commission the plaintiff received as notice only an order
which alleged fraud without detailing the facts constituting the fraud. No copy of the complaint was given
him nor was the complainant at any time brought into
the hearing and cross examined.
In Dyment v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal.
App: 260, 207 Pac. 409, there was filed with the Board of
Examiners a complaint that Dyment had procured his
certificate through fraud and misrepresentation. The
Court of Appeal, speaking of the question whether a
person in the administrative hearing might object to the
sufficiency of the written charge lodged against him,
said:
''The right to present such a question in every
form of action or proceeding, whether civil, crimSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inal, or quasi-criminal is practically universal
under the genius of Anglo-Saxon institutions, if
not under all systems for the administration of
justice. It may almost be said to be a natural
right, for the idea that a man may be brought to
trial upon an insufficient charge is opposed to the
sense of justice inherent in the human breast ...
''The complaint fails to state the facts constituting the fraud and misrepresentation by
means of which it is alleged that appellant procured his reciprocity certificate. The averment is
that the person making the complaint 'charges
Philip Dyment with having been guilty of unprofessional conduct by violating section 14 of chapter 354 of the Statutes of 1913 and acts amendatory thereof of the state of California, in that he
(Philip Dyment) procured by fraud and misrepresentation a certificate to practice medicine and
surgery in the state of California.' We are of the
opinion that the complaint is insufficient.
''It is of course, needless to cite authorities
upon the proposition that neither as to pleadings
nor as to evidence must the procedure in trials
before medical boards be marked by the refinements and subtleties which are characteristic of
the conduct of actions in courts of law. The cases
upon this point are both uniform and numerous.
Still, gh:ing to the rule its full scope, a complaint
in such a proceeding must give an alleged erring
practitioner such no.tice of the nature of the
charge against him as will enable him to formulate
a defense. (Citing cases.) This the complaint
now before us does not do. It is probably not
possible to conceive of the many different practices by means of which an applicant fraudulently
might procure the issuance to him of a certificate
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licensing him to practice medicine and surgery,
and a complaint against him for having brought
such an attempt to fruition ought to notify him
of the specific acts committed by him in the attempt.''
The California Supreme Court approved this and denied a hearing of this case, saying ( 207 Pac. 412) :
" ... the complaint must be sufficient in its
statement of facts to show actual unprofessional
conduct by the person charged, or it will not give
the board power or jurisdiction to revoke his certificate, and if a revocation is ordered on such a
complaint the holder thereof may maintain a proceeding in certiorari to have it annulled for the
want of jurisdiction of the hoard to make the
order, as well where he did not make the objection
to the board as where he did object."
In Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal. App. 297, 212 Pac.
942, the California Court of Appeal held that the Commissioner of Corporations acted without jurisdiction
under the Corporate Securities Act, in revoking the certificate of a broker. The following notice had been sent
to the broker by the Commissioner: ''You are hereby
notified to appear at this office at 2:30p.m., on Friday,
September 29, 1922, to show cause why your broker's
certificate should not be revoked." The broker appeared at the hearing by his attorney and after the hearing the broker's certificate was suspended. The statute
did not require any particular procedure, but the Court
said:
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"Applying the rule to the present case, it
follows that, even though an attorney appeared
for petitioner at the time noticed, the commissioner would not have jurisdiction to make the
order if the complaint or notice did not state facts
showing that the petitioner had committed some
breach within the purview of the act. This is so,
not because the statute requires the filing of
charges against the broker, but because the constitutional guaranty of due process of law requires
that he be allowed to appear and defend, and the
established rules of procedure demand that the
accused shall be given 'such notice of the nature of
the charge against him as will enable him to formulate a defense.' Dyment v. Board of Medical
Examiners (Cal. App.), 207 Pac. 409, 411. The
rule is particularly applicable here for two reasons: (1) The proceeding is 'highly penal in its
nature' (Schomig v. Keiser (Cal. App.) 209 Pac.
550) ; and ( 2) the only conceivable ground of revocation was based upon fraud and misrepresentation, and the accused should have been notified of
the facts constituting the fraud or misrepresentation (Dyment v. Board of Med. Examiners (Cal.
App.), 207 Pac. 409, 412).
"(3) The notice mailed to the petitioner was
merely an order to show cause why his certificate
should not be revoked. It contained no charges
·Of any nature and nothing from which he could
ascertain what he would be required to defend.
It was therefore insufficient to give the commissioners any jurisdiction to either suspend or revoke the certificate.''
Like the proceeding before the California commission, this proceeding is highly penal in its nature, and
deprives Mr. Gibbs of his rights of due process.
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In State vs. Becker, 34 S. W. (2d) 27, the Missouri
Court had a proceeding before it under a statute almost identical with Section 81-1-21 of the Utah Statutes
under ·which the commission acted. That statute provided that "registration under section 22 may be refused, or any registration granted may be revoked by
the commissioner if, after a reasonable notice and a
hearing the commissioner determines that such applicant
or registrant so registered'': (then follow the five subsections listed in the Utah Statute). Acting under this
section the Missouri commissioner of securities caused
to be served the following notice on the plaintiffs:
"Whereas it has been charged that you and
your agents have violated and are violating the
provision of an act of the 55th General Assembly
of Missouri" ... (here follows a detailed description of the act) ''and
'' ''Vhereas, you have refused to cooperate
with the Commissioner of Securities of the State
of Missouri and his agents and representatives in
the examination of your books, papers and records
in order to determine whether or not you have or
are now violating the Missouri Securities Act.
'' 'You are therefore notified and directed to
be and appear before the undersigned Commissioner of Securities of the State of Missouri at
room 204 in the State Capitol Building in the City
of Jefferson, County of Cole and State of Missouri, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on Thursday, the 15th
day of May, 1930, then and there to produce for
examination and use in evidence all of your books,
papers and records in regard to and concerning
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your transactions and sales of securities in the
State of Missouri down the years 1929 and 1930
in order that it may be ascertained and determined
by said Commissioner whether or not you have
violated or are now violating said act, and to show
cause why your registration as a dealer in securities in the State of Missouri should not be revoked under the provisions of section 23 of said
act for the causes named in paragraphs numbered
1, 3 and 5 of said section, as provided by law.'
The person aggrieved under that order brought an
action in the lower court and the Supreme Court ruled
that this notice was not reasonable notice under the statute, saying:
''The notice is a double-barreled effort. It
orders the production of books and papers and
orders relators to show cause why their licenses
should not be revoked under section 23 and causes
named in paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 of said section.
It contains no charges, and the commissioner did
not furnish such information. How could they
show cause without official information as to the
charges~ A hearing presupposes the existence of
charges. There could be no hearing without
charges. Therefore, it seems clear that the Legislature intended 'reasonable notice' to include information as to the charges. If the words 'reasonable notice' as used do not include such information, then the section is in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution . . . '' (citing
cases) "It must be presumed that the ~egislature,
by providing in section 23 for a hearing on 'reasonable notice,' did not intend to violate the Constitution.
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· · ": e understand respondents to concede that
'reasonable notice' includes information as to the
nature of the charges, but they contend that reference in the notice to certain paragraphs of section
23 was 'reasonable notice' within the meaning of
the section. \V e do not think so. One proceeded
against under the section must be advised of the
charges by 'reasonable notice.' It could not have
been the intention of the Legislature that persons
who might be proceeded against should carry with
them pocket editions of the act that they might be
advised of the charges by referring to the statute.
The contemplated hearing without 'reasonable
notice' is in excess of the commissioner's authority, and our rule should be made absolute.''
Paragraph 4 of respondent's complaint sets forth
the notice which was sent to respondent by the commission. Clearly, that notice is no more reasonable notice
as required by the statute than was the notice set forth
in the :Missouri case of State vs. Becker, supra. In fact,
the Utah Securities Commission went even further and
issued a suspension order without any notice whatever
which operated immediately, although the statute specifically provides that the revocation may be had only
after ''a reasonable notice and a hearing.'' (Sec. 821-21). That section in authorizing the suspension of the
dealer's registration pending the hearing requires that
such order shall state the cause for such suspension.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the complaint (Abs. 3) set forth
the order and allege its insufficiency and illegality. The
order states no cause. It says merely that the respondent "has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
with the sale of certain securities and has demonstrated
its unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer in
securities within the State of Utah.''
Appellants' brief suggests that the defect of lack of
notice was cured by the bill of particulars. The complaint, however, (Paragraph 8) alleges:
''That the said so-called bill of particulars
wholly failed to set forth facts sufficient to support or sustain in anywise the said order to show
cause served upon the plaintiff herein by the
defendants herein on August 12, 1939, as more
particularly set forth in paragraph 4 hereof; that
said bill of particulars failed to set forth facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the plaintiff herein or to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause for the suspension of the plaintiff from transacting business as a dealer in
securities within the State of Utah, and particularly failed to state facts sufficient to constitute
fraud or any violation of law, either as set forth
in said notice of August 12, 1939, or a:t all.''
Plaintiff in this case had to rely on a negative. It
stated a fact, not a conclusion, that the bill of particulars
lacked certain necessary allegations. If the defendants
desired amplification and the setting forth in detail of
the bill of particulars their procedure was to demur specially on this ground. The request could then have been
easily complied with. Appellants cannot now rely upon
their general demurrer to argue that the bill of particulars was not set forth in the complaint.
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Appellants cite In Re Burnette, 85 Pac. 575, 73 Kan.
609, as authority that these revocation proceedings are
not criminal actions. Yet even the Kansas court twice
fo1md it necessary to qualify its decision of In Re Burnette, supra. In In Re Smith, 73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584,
that court said:
''While formal and technical pleading is not
essential to this proceeding· it is important that
the charges against an attorney shall be so specific
as to fairly inform him of the precise nature of
the misconduct with which he is accused. If the
facts of the charged misconduct are clearly
brought to his attention, the form in which they
are stated and whether in 1 or 2 paragraphs is not
of great importance ... Although the proceeding
is not cri1ninal it is of such a nature and the
jttdgment of disbarment is so severe and so direful
in its results to an attorney that something more
than a mere preponderance of proof is necessary."
(Italics added.)
Clearly this is more than a mere civil special proceeding.
See also In Re TVilcox, 90 Kan. 646, 135 Pac. 995, in which
the Kansas court holds that so far as awarding costs is
concerned, a disbarment proceeding is an action rather
than a special proceeding.
Appellants' brief cites the Utah case of State vs.
Cragun, 81 Utah 457, 20 Pac. (2d) 247. In that case
Cragun was convicted in the district court for practicing
obstetrics without a license. His license had prior to
that trial been revoked by the department of registration,
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and he had not appealed to the district court from that
revocation. Instead, as a defense to the independent
criminal action against him in the district court he urged
that the proceedings of revocation before the department were irregular. This Court, in affirming the conviction made clear that this defense was a collateral
and not direct attack on the proceedings, and said:
''A complaint may well be held insufficient to
support a judgment when attacked in a direct proceeding, but held sufficient when attacked collaterally.''
The proceeding at bar, however, is a direct, not a
collateral, attack upon the sufficiency of the revocation
of the plaintiff's license, and the procedure followed
therein. It is a direct attack upon the penal deprivation of the plaintiff's right to engage in daily livelihood.
In its discussion of the due process question, the appellants' brief cites People vs. Ha.sbrouck, 11 Utah 291,
39 Pac. 918, and McCarty vs. Public Service Commission,
94 Utah 304, 77 Pac. (2d) 331, as alleged authority for
the statement that administrative boards are not courts
and their acts cannot be tested by reference to judicial
codes. This Court, however, has definitely held that
these administrative bodies, in the exercise of their
function in revoking licenses, are acting in a judicial capacity. In Baker vs. Department of Registration, 78
Utah 424, 3 Pac. (2d) 1082, this Court said:
'' rrhe right to practice medicine is a valuable
property right, and the procePding to revoke surh
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right is essentially the exercise of a judicial function. \Yhile the department of registration is primarily an administrative body, it exercises judicial functions when it undertakes to hear and
determine whether or not a license of a physician
and surgeon shall be revoked. It is while exercising such function essentially a tribunal.''
This complaint raises the objection that in its exercise of the judicial po,ver the commission failed to follow
the procedure necessary to give the defendant the rights
which he is guaranteed by the Constitution, of a fair trial
in this criminal or quasi criminal proceeding. While it
is not necessary that the code procedure set out for
courts be strictly followed by the commission, still the
commission's procedure must be such that the inherent
rights of the accused to a fair trial are preserved. The
complaint says that this was not done, and in so saying states a cause of action.
We have already discussed the failure of the commission to give proper notice, alleged as a cause of action
in the complaint. In addition to that, the complaint alleges in paragraph 9 that the plaintiff was not informed
as to the defendants' informant nor confronted with the
informant or complaining witness. This Court has already ruled that in the absence of statutory authority
depositions cannot be taken in these administrative hearings, that it is necessary to have the direct testimony of
the ·witnesses. M oormeister vs. Golding, 84 Utah 324,
27 Pac. (2d) 447). In a hearing which has for its purpose the depriving of the respondent of his means of liveSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lihood and which the authorities we have already cited
affirm is the equivalent of a criminal hearing, the person whose registration is being revoked surely has a fundamental right to know who the complaining witness is
and to have the opportunity to cross examine that witness.
The complaint, then, states a cause of action in alleging that the plaintiff was deprived in the hearing of
due process of law by the irregularities of the hearing.
It sets forth the following irregularities, all of which
taken together constitute such a lack of fundamental
procedure of justice in a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding that it should be severely condemned:
The suspension order failed to state the facts
of the accusation. (Complaint, Par. 4, Abs. 2.)
1.

2. The suspension order failed to state facts sustaining the accusation. (Complaint Par. 5 and 6, Abs.
3 and 4.)
3.

The suspension order was issued contrary to
law. (Complaint, Par. 6, Abs. 4.)
4. The bill of particulars failed to set forth facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Complaint,
Par. 7, 8, 11, Abs. 4, 5, 6.)
5. The plaintiff was not informed as to defendant's informant and was not confronted with the complaining witness. (Complaint, Par. 9, Abs. 5.)
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6. The commission in arriving at its findings and
conclusions acted irregularly in having the transcript of
only one side before it. (Complaint, Par. 13, Abs. 8.)

D. The conzpla int alleged a total lack of jttstification for
the commission's order in plaintiff's acts pri-or to the
hearing and as adduced a.t the hearing, and in the whole
procedure. (Paragraphs 15 to 18, 21, 22, Abs. 8-10.)

In the second main section of this brief we shall
discuss the question whether the procedure authorized by
the statute constitutes an appeal and a review of the
decision of the commission or an independent action.
If it does constitute an appeal, paragraphs 14 to 18 of
the complaint themselves state a cause of action because
they set forth the grounds necessary for an appeal from
this order of the commission :
That the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are contrary to and not supported by the issues raised
by the order to show cause, the order of suspension, the
bill of particulars, or the amended bill of particulars.
1.

2. That the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are not supported by, are in conflict with, and go beyond the evidence adduced at the hearing.
3. That the conclusions of law are not supported by
the findings of fact and are contrary to law.

4. That the conclusions of law are contrary to the
evidence and to the findings of fact and are contrary
to law.
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5.

That the order of cancellation

IS

contrary to

law.
On the other hand, if this procedure is not an appeal but is an independent action, the important allegation of the complaint against the commission by the person aggrieved is that there are no grounds for revocation. This is necessarily a statement of fact because it
involves a negative. Paragraph 21 of the complaint is a
sufficient allegation of this negative:
"That the plaintiff herein has committed no
act in the sale, purchase or exchange of securities
either of commission or omission which in anywise
justifies or sustains the final order of cancellation
of registration of the plaintiff as a dealer in securities, dated November 8, 1939, or at all, and is
entitled to have said order of cancellation set
aside and revoked and its registration as a dealer
in securities reinstated."
In addition to this allegation the complaint alleges
that the attorney general conceded that there was no
charge of actual fraud and no evidence of actual fraud,
and that it was further admitted that there was no fraud
on the part of the plaintiff herein nor any intent to defraud, and that no evidence was adduced either on behalf
of the plaintiff or commission in any wise showing any
fraud or intent to defraud. The appellants' brief attempts to belittle this allegation by the statement that
the attorney general sat as a member of the commission
and his remarks would not be binding on the other two
members of the commission. The appellants forget that
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the attorney general "·as not only a member of the commission judging the respondent, but was also, through
his assistant, the attorney prosecuting the action.
Whether or not his remarks would be binding on him as
judge, they bind him as prosecutor. The admission was
actually made by the present attorney general who was
then the assistant attorney general prosecuting the case.
Admissions of an attorney in open hearing during its
progress are of course conclusive upon his client. The
attorney general, acting as attorney, cannot now say in
his brief that it was not as attorney, but as judge that
he made the admissions charged in the complaint. This
attempt illustrates one of the many dangers of a .system
in which representatives of the same office act both as
prosecutor and judge. Unless our courts hold a strict
rein on commission practices, what advantages there are
of the commission system will be lost in a deprivation
of personal liberty. We believe this court will not permit the practices alleged in respondent's complaint to go
unchecked.

II. The Court below and the Plaintiff and Respond. ent followed the proper and statutory procedure (Assignments I, II, and fll, and Special
Demurrer, Assignment IV).
The appellants question the Court's procedure in
suspending ex parte the revocation order of the Securities Commission, in authorizing respondent to continue
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ation by the Court of the action, and in failing to require
security pending this determination.
This is an objection to the procedure of the Court
which the appellants attempt to raise by their First,
Second and Third assignments and by their special demurrer discussed under their Fourth assignment. The
action was brought under Sec. 82-1-41, Rev. Stat. 1933,
which reads as follows :
''Any person directly affected and aggrieved
by any final order of the Commission made under
any of the provisions of this title may, within 30
days after notice of such order, institute an action in the district court of the county at the seat
of government against the Commission, setting
out his grievance and right to complain. In its
answer the Commission may set out any matter
in justification; and the court shall determine the
issues on both questions of law and fact, and may
affirm, set aside or modify the order complained
of."
This section contemplates one of two procedures,
under either one of which the Court's action is proper.
An appeal to the district court from the commission's order involving a trial de novo on the record.
1.

2. An action reviewing the decision of the commission by the taking of testimony anew in the district court.
An analysis of the section of the statute will show
that the Court's action was proper under either of these
theories.
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It is self-evident that if the trial in the district court
is a review of the action of the commission upon the
record, it was proper for the Court to order a transcript
of that record of the commission brought before it. In
D. &; R. G. W. R. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 98
Utah 431, 100 Pac. (2d) 552, this Court held that the
procedure set forth in Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935,
Sec. 9, involves a trial de novo upon the record. Sec. 821-41, set forth above, is similar in the following respects
to the act interpreted in the D. &; R. 0. W. case. Both
provide that any person aggrieved by the action of the
commission may, within thirty days after notice of the
decision, bring an action in the district court. Both provide that the person aggrieved shall be plaintiff and the
commission defendant. The act interpreted in the D.
&; R. G. W. case provides that the action shall be a "plenary review" of the action of the commission; while Sec.
82-1-41 says that the Court "may affirm, set aside, or
modify the order complained of.'' ''To review an action
is to study or examine it again,'' this Court stated in
that case. To "examine, set aside or modify the order"
of the commission limits the district court to the order
complained of. We believe that this contemplates a review of the proceedings and that the interpretation of
this court in the D. & R. G. W. R. Co. case should apply.
In an appeal from the commission to the district
court the parties in the absence of statute are put into
the position that they were in before the order of the
commission. This Court has so ruled in M oorrneister vs.
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Golding, Director of Registration Department, 84 Utah
324, 27 Pac. (2d) 447:
''The general rule is, unless otherwise provided by statute, that an appeal, where the case is
triable de novo, vacates the judgment appealed
from ...
"It will be noted from our statute in the case
of an appeal from a judgment or order made by
the department of registration revoking a license
to the district court, it makes no provision whatsoever for the necessity of giving a supersedeas
bond to stay the judgment appealed from. There
is no provision in the statute whatever keeping
the judgment effective pending the appeal. This
being so, the general rule would seem to apply.
This would be true, regardless of whether the
judgment may be considered as self-executing, or
whether it was not, because in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, the appeal vacates it.
Hence the effect of an appeal from a judgment,
or order, of the department of registration revoking the license, leaves the parties in the same
situation with reference to the rights involved as
they were prior to the rendition of revocation of
license.''
This ruling is directly contrary to the argument of
appellants, who claim that the natural and logical conclusion is that the legislature intended orders of such
bodies to stand until found unlawful.
If, then, the Court was acting under the first theory
that this action in the district court is a trial de novo
on the record of the action of the Commission, it did ex-
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actly what this Court has said is contemplated in an appeal to the district court in such a case: (1) It ordered
a transcript of the record so that it could review it on
the facts as well as on the law; (2) it suspended the
order of the commission and placed the parties in the
status they were in before the order of the commission,
and it permitted this without a supersedeas bond.
If we look at the statute under the second theory,
to-wit, that the procedure outlined there contemplates
the taking of new evidence under new issues, we find that
under this theory the Court acted likewise in conformity
to the statute. It is significant that the section of the
statute limits the action in the Court to a decision on the
ruling of the commission. Clearly, the commission's
order is the subject matter of the action. The ''aggrieved
party'' is the plaintiff. The commission, which by its
action has caused the grievance, is the defendant. What
is the grievance to set up in the pleading~ Primarily,
of course, the order itself. Secondarily, the lack of justification for the order both in lack of evidence to substantiate the findings and in the procedure which violates
the rights of the plaintiff. Appellants urge that under
a new trial in which evidence is taken, the procedure of
the commission is immaterial, and that it was therefore
improper to allege them. If this were so, the allegations in the complaint objecting to the high-handed procedure of the commission might be superflous, and might
be stricken by proper motions. But they cannot he reached
by defendants' general demurrer, and are harmless. A
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copy of the transcript under this theory might not be
necessary, but an order requiring it would at the most
be harmless error. The better view, however, should be
that an action brought for the purpose of determining
whether the district court should affirm, set aside, or
modify the order of the Commission, necessarily should
have before it all the facts leading to the making of the
order by the Commission-including the commission's
procedure-whether these facts are presented by a full
transcript of the proceedings or by testimony showing
what the proceedings were.
If this section requires the taking of evidence, could
the Court cancel the order of the commission pending the
hearing¥ Courts have an inherent right in equity to
prevent a hardship on the plaintiff pending the outcome
of the trial. In addition to this inherent right it receives
statutory powers. Section 20-7-25, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, provides :
"When jurisdiction is, by statute, conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all means necessary
to carry it into effect are also given; and in the
exercise of jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding is not specifically pointed out by statute, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which may appear most conformable to
the spirit of the statute or of the codes of procedure.''
This Court has heretofore held justifiable under
these powers even in the absence of specific statutory
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authority an order requiring a garnishee to open a safety
deposit box ( TT" est Cache Sugar Company vs. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, 190 Pac. 946), and an order to a mortgagee to dispose of perishable goods pending foreclosure
(Watts vs. Greenwood, 49 Utah 118, 162 Pac. 72). And
in Baker vs. Department of Registration, 78 Utah 424,
3 Pac. (2d) 1082. this Court said, speaking of itself:
'' "\Vhile the cases just cited from this jurisdiction deal with the power of a court to, in the
absence of legislative provisions, prescribe proceedings in a complaint pending before it, there is
nothing in the language of section 1813 [now 207-23] which limits the power of the court to such
cases. The statute applies alike in all cases where
jurisdiction is conferred by statute without regard
to whether such jurisdiction is original or appellate ...
''Thus, in the absence of any specific legislative provision regulating the procedure that shall
be followed in appeals from a judgment or order
of the director of the department of registration
in revoking or refusing to revoke the license of a
physician and surgeon, this court has the authority, and it is its duty, to direct the procedure that
shall be followed.''
This Court has already held that in the absence of
statutory requirements to the contrary an appeal to the
district court vacates the order of the commission appealed from. M oormeister vs . .Golding, supra. Just so,
we submit the district court has the power to stay the
harm ·which would be done by an invalid order pending
the final determination of the question whether or not
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that order is valid. The commission's revocation of this
respondent's registration was drastic in its effect. It
deprived Mr. Gibbs of his means of daily livelihood.
Though unquestionably the matter should be one for a
speedy determination by the Court, the record shows
that in this case over one year elapsed between the filing
of plaintiff's complaint and the ruling by the district
judge on defendants' demurrer thereto. Clearly, the
prevention by the administrative body of the respondents' right to practice a livelihood for such a period of
time and longer is a hardship which should be prevented
by the Court when an issue is raised by the complaint
that the commission acted wrongfully or beyond its power
in revoking the registration.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the complaint, which
set forth the irregularities of the commission in revoking the respondent's registration, stated a cause of action, and that the Court in staying the effect of this revocation until after proper review of this administrative
act by the courts acted not only within its powers but
within its duties.
I. The plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action.

A.

The complaint alleged that the commission were

wholly without jurisdiction to enter their final order of
cancellation because Title 82, Revised Statutes of Utah,
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1933, and particularly Sec. 82-1-21, Subsection ( 4) thereof,
is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
B. The complaint alleged that the commission were
wholly without jurisdiction to enter their final order of
cancellation because the transaction on which the order
is based is exempted by statute from the jurisdiction of
the commission.
C. The complaint alleged that the procedure before
the Securities Commission was not a fair trial and deprived the plaintiff of due process of law.
D. The complaint alleged a total lack of justification for the commission's order prior to the hearing,
adduced at the hearing and in the whole procedure.
II. The Court below and the plaintiff and respondent followed the proper and statutory procedure.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE, RICHARDS & McKAY,
Attorneys for Respondent
and Plaintiff.
720 Newhouse Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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